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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF Tim 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD E. HULBERT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
16197 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the respondent Gerald 
E. Hulbert to recover attorneys fees in the amount of 
$77,275.00 and court costs in the amount of $540.65 from 
the appellant State of Utah pursuant to Sections 63-30a-l, 2 
and 3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 245 
of the Laws of Utah, 1977, "'hich became effective May 10, 
1977. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOlVER COURT 
Following a non-jury trial the lower court granted 
judgment for the plaintiff-respondent in the amount of 
$62,384.99. 
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RELEIF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment 
of the lower court on the grounds that it had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the action, the judgment is 
not supported by the evidence and the statute upon which 
the judgment is based is invalid as private, special or 
retroactive legislation under the United State and 
Utah Constitutions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
With some marked exceptions, there is competent 
evidence in this case which would support the Findings 
of Fact of the court below. Those findings of fact, with 
the exceptions noted, are as follows: 
1. In 1975, a series of indictments were issued 
by a Utah State Grand Jury against Gerald Hulbert, the 
plaintiff-respondent, containing twelve counts in all which 
were issued in connection with and arose out of certain 
claimed acts and/or omissions of Mr. Hulbert during the 
performance of his duties and within the scope of his 
employment as Chairman and Director of the Utah State 
Liquor Control Commission. 
-2-
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2. Ultimately, each of the indictments were 
disposed of by a verdict of "not guilty" after trial, 
by an acquittal or by a dismissal of the action by the 
court. 
3. Mr. Hulbert retained the services of 
Wayne L. Black and John L. Black and their law firm of 
Rawlings, Roberts and Black to defend himself against the 
charges contained in the indictments. 
4. Waype L. Black and John L. Black were lifelong 
friends of Mr. Hulbert and no fee arrangement was made 
between the parties at the outset of their work on his 
behalf. (It should here be noted that such services 
commenced in January of 1974 and included appearances by 
John L. Black as Mr. Hulbert's counsel at hearings 
conducted by the Salt Lake County Attorney and the Utah 
Advisory Council on Liquor Control in October and November 
of that year. R. 138-141, 188-192.) 
5. After the first group of indictments were 
issued in May, 1975, a $5,000 retainer was paid to the 
Black firm by Mr. Hulbert and an additional fee of $5,000 
was estimated for trial of the matter, if necessary, and 
$2,000 for an appeal. (It should be noted that the 
retainer, trial fee and appeal fee, if necessary, were 
agreed upon by the parties at that time. See Mr. Hulbert's 
-3-
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testimony at R. 143-144, and Wayne L. Black's testimony 
at R. 199-200. It should also be noted that the first 
group of indictments included 4 indictments with 7 
counts of perjury, false and material statements and 
embezzlement of whiskey. See Mr. Wayne L. Black's 
testimony describing same at R. 196.) 
6. A second and third set of indictments 
were handed down in July and August of 1975, and the 
Blacks continued to represent Mr. Hulbert thereon. 
7. The matter was vigorously prosecuted by 
special attorneys general appointed by the State and 
Salt Lake County Attorney's office, and the defense 
was ?retracted, complicated, time consuming and difficult. 
8. Attendant publicity contributed to the task 
of defense counsel. 
9. Mr. Hulbert's mental and physical health 
deteriorated during the protracted litigation and any 
discussion of fees was deferred, but he finally insisted 
on a billing because of his strong sense of personal 
and moral obligation to pay for the services rendered 
and to know where he stood vis-a-vis the fee obligation. 
10. In response to Mr. Hulbert's request, 
Wayne L. Black wrote a letter in September of 1976, 
-4-
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offering to consider $18,500 the total fee, taking 
into account $8,500 paid prior to that date by Hulbert 
who, though unemployed and ill, informed Mr. Black 
that the fee suggested in the September letter was 
token in nature and unacceptable to him. 
(Exhibit 4-P is the letter from Mr. Black 
to Mr. Hulbert and clearly sets forth the total fee 
for all services to be performed on all the indictments 
of $18,500. It is not an "offer" or "suggestion" in 
any sense of the word. Exhibit 5-P is a note from 
Hulbert to the Blacks in response to the billing in 
which he acknowledges the fee as "very, very minimal" 
and states his only concern "is making prompt payment 
to you." Nothing in the written documents indicates 
any non-acceptance or repudiation of the stated fee 
by either party.) 
11. Subsequently, Mr. Hulbert and counsel 
agreed orally that Hulbert would pay the law firm a 
reasonable and fair fee "if and when" he became able 
to do so. 
[The evidence will not support such an agreement. 
Hulbert testified that he subsequently told Mr. Black "I 
would make it right with him if I could find it in my 
means at any time." (R. 153.) Wayne Black's testimony 
-5-
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on the matter was that Hulbert told him "I don't know 
when or how I am going to be able to do it, but I'm not 
going to rest until I pay you something that is reason-
able and that more nearly represents what you have 
done for me and my family," to which Black responded 
"Well, Gerry, let's just kind of let it go and see 
what happens, and if you are able ever to do that, or 
to pay an additional amount, that would be fine 
with me, and I will kind of leave it up to you." (R. 
217-218). On cross examination Mr. Black testified 
as follows: 
"Q. And wasn't it your intent 
in writing the letter that is an 
exhibit here, that I think is dated 
September the 3rn, that you were 
going to satisfy him by setting an 
amount beyond which you wouln not 
assert any legal claim against him? 
A. That's right." (R.322.) 
And he further testified as to the subsequent oral 
discussion as follows: 
"MR. HANSEN: I'm simply asking 
if there has been anything that's 
happened since Septenber 3rd upon 
which Mr. Black feels that he could 
assert a claim for an additional 
amount than what is in the letter and 
except as it applies based upon that 
statute. 
A. li'ell, I think--
-6-
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Q. In.other words, absent the 
legislature doing anything, now that 
you have had a chance because Mr. 
Hulbert is not in an emotional state 
to look at it perhaps under less 
friendship duress, to say that you 
do have a claim against him? 
A. Well, I think that the thing 
that happened on September 3rd and the 
days that followed was not really a 
thing that rose to the level of a new 
contract, or any contract at all. 
I advised in my letter Mr. Hulbert 
of an amount of money that would 
satisfy me, having in mind all of 
the problems and travails that he was 
undergoing at that time. And when 
he came back after receiving that 
letter and after writing a little 
note that he wrote to me and talked 
to me about this, he was saying, and 
did say to me, I won't accept that 
amount of money as being a discharge 
of the obligation for what you have 
done for me, and I don't know when 
or how I will be able to do it, but 
I'm going to make this right with 
you, Mr. Black, and I'm going to do 
what is right, you know. Gerry 
never called me "Hr. Black", that 
wasn't the words. And I in turn 
said, well, whatever you are able to 
do, or can do, I will be satisfied with. 
If that's interpreted as a new 
agreement, the agreement was that he 
was going to pay me what was reasonable 
and right regardless of the content of 
my letter, and I was willing to accept 
his analvsis of what was reasonable and 
right as- a discharge of that obligation. 
Now, that's the way I looked at that." 
(R. 324-326). 
The fact of the matter is that at the time of trial Mr. 
Hulbert had only paid only $11,500 plus two small checks 
-7-
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amounting to $564.99 for court reporters and transcripts, 
of which sum $1,500 was paid for representation on tax 
matters not involved in this action. (R. 153-154, 177-178, 
emphasis added.)] 
12. No accounting or itemization of specific 
services was prepared by the law firm at that time. An 
itemized record of services was prepared by the law firm 
in 1977 for use in support of Mr. Hulbert's claim which 
he thereafter submitted to the Utah State Board of ExaMiners. 
13. Mr. Hulbert intended his obligations to be one 
for reasonable fees at a then undetermined level, and his 
counsel intended that the obligation would be contingent upon 
Hulbert's future ability to pay. 
(As pointed out above the only obligation Hulbert 
incurred was the billing set forth in Exhibit 4-P for $18,500 
and his ability to pay has never reached that level as his 
total payments on that fee at the tine of trial was only 
$10,000.) 
14. In 1977, the Utah State Legislature adopted 
Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), which reads 
as follows: 
"If a state grand jury indicts an 
officer or employee, in connection with 
or arising out of any act or omission 
of that officer or employee durinq the 
-8-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
performance of his duties, within 
the scope of his employment or under 
color of his authority, and that 
innictrnent is quashed or dismissed 
or results in a judgment of acquittal, 
unless the indictment is quashed or 
dismissed upon application or motion 
of the prosecuting attorney, that 
officer or employee shall be entitled 
to recover from the state reasonable 
attorney's fees and court costs 
necessarily incurred in the' defense 
of that indictment." 
15. The indictments handed down against Hulbert 
were connected \vith the performance of his public duties 
within the meaning of the statute. 
16. The efforts of defense counsel in suppressing 
illegal or inadmissible evidence \vere totally responsible 
for the dismissal of two counts in the indictments (by the 
prosecution) and the defense of those two counts was such 
an integral part of the entire defense that they cannot be 
excluded from this lawsuit. 
17. Hulbert incurred attorneys fees and court 
costs and agreed and promised to pay Rawlings, Roberts anq 
Black for the fair value of their services. 
(This finding of fact is contrary to the actual 
obligation between the parties as represented by Exhibits 
4-P and 5-P and no subsequent agreement was ever entered 
into between the oarties as hereinabove set forth.) 
-9-
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18. f.1r. Hulbert and his counsel agreed that 
Hulbert would pay reasonable attorneys fees if and when 
he obtained the means. 
[The evidence does not support any such agreement 
between the parties, and the foregoing finding is totally 
refuted by respondent's letter dated September 9, 1977 
(Exhibit 1-D) to his attorneys in which he confirmed and 
stated his prior approval of the agreement to pay $18,500 
for his attorneys' services.] 
19. The passage of Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, by the Utah Legislature was, in fact, the 
occurrence of the condition precedent, or contingency, 
upon which Hulbert's obligation hinged, and he is now 
obligated by his own promise to pay a reasonable fee for 
services rendered, and he has "incurred" such a fee 
within the meaning of the statute. 
(This finding of fact is a conclusion of law by 
the lower court and the means by which the lower court 
transferred the factually non-existent ability of Hulbert 
to pay not only the attorneys' fees he was obligated to 
pay as evidenced by Exhibits 4-P and 5-P but also such 
additional fees as he would like to have paid to his life-
1 
long friends, the Blacks, onto the shoulders of the beleguer~ 
taxpayers of the State of Utah whose unlimited ability to 
pay is hereby conveniently substituted for that of the 
-10-
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respondent Hulbert. The pertinent facts are that Hulbert 
conceived of the idea of a state reimbursement statute, 
obtained a draft of the bill through the assistance of his 
attorney Wayne L. Black, secured its sponsorship in the 
legislature and successfully lobbied it to enactment. 
(R. 156-158). As to the latter Mr. Hulbert testified at 
R. 158: 
"Q. And was the bill there 
ultimately enacted into law? 
A. Yes, sir, it was. I must 
confess that I lobbied many, many 
days up there with people that I 
thought I knew, and it was a personal 
effort that I feel succeeded in getting 
it passed." 
The bill as enacted was made retroactive for two years so 
as to cover the indictments in Hulbert's own case. See 
Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
Chapter 245 of the Laws of Utah 1977.) 
20. Hulbert's exposure was great and the State 
hired well-knm.;n and experienced outside counsel to 
prosecute the charges against him, which they did in an 
effective and agressive fashion, and Hulbert was justified 
in his decision to seek not only "adequate" counsel but 
the most effective counsel he could. 
(This finding of fact as to the effectiveness 
of the prosecution would clearly be suspect in light of the 
failure of the prosecution to secure a single conviction out 
-11-
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of twelve felony counts in the several indictments. This 
is a conclusion of the lower court that is unwarranted 
under the evidence in the case.) 
21. The determination of a reasonable fee must 
include the many factors ordinarily used by an attorney in 
setting a fee himself. These include the following: (1) 
The time spent on the matter~ (2) The complexity of the case 
and difficulty of representation of the client~ (3) The 
skill, competence and experience of counsel~ (4) The 
ability of the client to pay~ (5) The personal relationship 
between client and attorney~ (6) The actual outcome of 
the case in view of the results possible at the outset. 
22. Counsel for t1r. Hulbert spent 525 hours on 
this case and made 65 court appearances. Two trials and 
two appeals were successfully prosecuted and Hulbert was 
eventually exonerated on all twelve counts in question 
herein, each of which involved felony charges and which 
could have resulted in substantial prison terms. 
23. The hourly fees of $75.00 per hour charged 
by counsel for Hulbert and the additional fees charged for 
court appearances, trials and appeals were within the range 
of reasonable fees for the services rendered, and the 
total fee, together with costs, claimed here by Hulbert 
of $77,275.00 is within the reasonable range. 
[In addition to the hourly charges, the total fee 
claimed by Hulbert in this action inclurted $10,000 for a jurY 
-12-
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trial from October 14-21, 1975, $7,500 for a non-'jury trial 
from DeceMber 2-5, 1975, and $200 for court appearances other 
than trials and appeals (R. 30~·) There is no evidence in the 
record of this case that Mr. Black ever "charged" Hulbert 
$75 per hour in addition to the claimed trial fees and court 
appearance fees for his services. The only fee ever 
asserted or claimed by the Blacks against Hulbert is the $18,5·00 
as set forth in Exhibit 4-P. As to whether he ever discussed 
hourly fees with his counsel, Hulbert testified that he did 
not and "that was the least of my concerns." (R. 169-170 .• }] 
24. Though $77,275.00 is within the "reasonable" 
range, some adjustment is appropriate because Hulbert 
enjoyed a close personal relationship with counsel, and some 
of the services provided were rendered with no expectation 
of payment because of that relationship. Further, it is 
possible that, in the absence of that high degree of personal 
regard for Hulbert, more of the research and support services 
might have been provided by law clerks and junior members 
of the firm, at a lower cost. Finally, Hulbert's ability to 
pay in this case is limited and dependent upon access to 
reimbursement by the State. Those additional factors 
presented by defendant result in a reasonable discount of 
20 percent of the attorney's fees to the sUM of $61,820.00, 
which is also within the "reasonable" range. 
(This finding that Hulbert's ability to pay is 
lim1ted and dependent upon access to reimbursement by the 
-13-
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State is clearly supportive of the fact, as before noted, 
that the legal fees "necessarily incurred" by Hulbert in this 
case, as measured by the basic ingredient of his ability to 
pay and not the ability of the State of Utah to pay such 
fees, is established by the fee set by his attorneys in 
Exhibit 4-P and Hulbert's incomplete payment thereof.) 
25. Hulbert necessarily incurred costs of court 
in the amount of $564.99 in the defense of the Grand Jury 
Indictments. 
26. The intent of the legislature as determined 
by the recording of legislative debate at the time of the 
passage of Section 63-20a-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, was 
that such "reasonable attorney's fees ••• necessarily 
incurred" are to be paid by the State of Utah out of the 
General Fund after such amount is determined by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
In addition to the foregoing facts as found by 
the lower court and to which appellant has noted its 
exceptions from the record in this case, it should be pointed 
out that Mr. Hulbert himself testified that he may have stated 
to members of the legislative analyst's office who were trying 
to determine the financial impact of Hulbert's legislation in 
the 1977 Legislature that he was obligated to pay $32,000 
to his attorneys for legal services reimbursable thereunder. 
(R. 346-348.) This was substantiated by Douglas A. McDonald, 
-14-
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a fiscal economist with the legislative fiscal analyst, 
who testified that he met with Mr. Hulbert during 
the 1977 legislative session at the State Capitol to 
determine the fiscal impact of Mr. Hulbert's bill--
Senate Bill No. 247--and Mr. Hulbert estimated his 
attorneys• fess thereunder to be "around $30,000" and 
that legal fees under the bill could run from $10,000 
to $40,000 per indictment. (R. 348-352). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT WAS NITHOUT JURISDICTION 
TO HEAR THIS MATTER WHICH JURISDICTION WAS 
VESTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The respondent sought recovery of $77,815.65 
for attorneys fees and costs allegedly incurred in the 
defense of nine grand jury indictments issued in 1975 in 
connection with the performance of his duties as chairman 
and director of the Utah State Liquor Control Commission. 
The sole basis for the complaint was the enactment of 
Senate Bill No. 24 7 contained in Chapter 245 of the Lav7s 
of Utah 1977, now included in Sections 63-30a-l, 2 and 3, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Section 63-30a-2 
thereof provides as follows: 
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"If a state grand jury indicts an 
officer or employee, in connection with 
or arising out of any act of omission of 
that officer or employee during the 
performance of his duties, 1-1i thin the 
scope of his employment or under color 
of his authority, and that indictment is 
quashed or dismissed or results in a 
judgment of acquittal, unless the indict-
m~nt is quashed or dismissed upon 
application or motion of the prosecuting 
attorney, that officer or employee shall 
be entitled to recover from the state the 
reasonable attorneys' fees and court 
costs necessarily incurred in the defense 
of that indictment." 
The foregoing enactment by the 1977 Utah Legislature 
did not provide funding for the payment of claims thereunder 
and the Legislature has made no appropriations for that 
purpose. The respondent's complaint does not allege that any 
such appropriation was ever made by the legislature. Under 
these circumstances the respondent's claim is controlled 
by Article VII, Section 13, and Article V, Section 1, of 
the Utah Constitution, and Sections 63-6-1 and 63-6-10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, pertaining to the powers 
of the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah and the 
separation of powers between the legislative, execu~ive 
and judicial branches of state government. Article VII, 
Section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
"***They [the Governor, Secretary 
of State and Attorney General) shall, 
also, constitute a Board of Examiners, 
with power to examine all claims aqainst 
the state except salaries or comnensation 
of officers fixed by law, and perform 
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such other duties or may be prescribed 
by law~ and no claim against the State, 
except for salaries and comoensation 
of officers fixed by law, shall be passed 
upon by the Legislature without having 
been considered and acted Upon by the 
said Board of Examiners." (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is well established that the foregoing constitutional 
provision grants broad powers to the Board of Examiners in 
examining into and determining the merits of claims asserted 
against the state. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
so held in Wood v. Budge, 13 U.2d 359, 374 P.2d 516 (1962) 
and explained the purpose therefor as follmV"s, at page 519 of 
Pacific Reporter: 
"Although the privilege is not ours 
to pass upon the wisdom of legislative 
action, we think it is not amiss to point 
out that due to the extent of its oowers 
as to such claims, the Legislature-should 
regard its responsibility as correspondingly 
grave~ and should bear in minn these facts: 
That the duty of examining into claims against 
the State was undoubtedly given to the Board 
of Examiners because the officers comprising 
it can be assured to be acquainted with the 
fiscal affairs of the State and to have a 
high sense of responsibility therefor; that 
the Board has better facilities at its command 
for investigation and inquiry into such 
matters than has the Legislature, including 
the fact that the Attorney General as the 
States' legal advisor was made a member of 
the Board purposely so that he and his staff 
could be of help in determining whether an 
asserted 'claim' against the State has any 
valid foundation, or whether it is simply a 
request for a gift or some other meritless 
attempt to obtain public funds, masquerading 
under the guise of such a 'claim'. 
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"For these reasons it is unquestion-
able that this function of the Board of 
Examiners was intended to be regarded 
as an important one; and that it is the 
legislative duty to give serious considera-
tion to its recommendations to the end that 
such claims be acted upon with prudence and 
wisdom to best serve the interests of the whole 
State and avoid making grants in cases where 
the State should assume no responsibility." 
In the case of unliquidated claims, as is involved 
in the case at bar, the Supreme Court of Utah has emphatically 
stated that the constitutional powers of the Board of Examiners 
include the right to investigate and act as a fact finder and 
advisor to the legislature, and that even as to liquidated 
claims its pmV'ers extend beyond mere auditing. See Bateman v. 
Board of Examiners, 7 U.2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, 382, (1953), and 
prior cases therein quoted with approval. In that case the 
court, with direct reference to the constitutional provision 
hereinabove set forth, stated as follows at Page 384 of the 
Pacific Reporter: 
"The question of importance is the 
extent of the authority conferred by the 
language, '***with power to examine all 
claims against the state.' This phraseology 
has given rise to much concern over the 
reciprocal powers and interrelationships 
of the departments of our state government. 
In the first place we think that the word 
'claim' was used in its broadest connotation 
and we recognize that it is susceptible of a 
variety of meanings: ranging from a normal 
claim; or the seeking of legislative 
largesse; or asserting a privilege; to 
asserting rights to compensation for 
property or materials furnished, or salary 
for services rendered, to the stRte." 
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With respect to the power of the Board of 
Examiners to examine and approve claims for whicn the 
legislature had already provided recourse the court in the 
Bateman case cited and quoted with approval from the case of 
State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33 u. 243, 93 P. 720 (1908) as 
follows at Page 386 of 322 P.2d Reporter: 
"This case (referring to ~1arioneaux 
v. Cutler, 32 u. 475, 91 P. 355) was 
followed by State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards 
wherein a court reporter sought to compel 
the State Auditor to allow his claim for 
mileage which the District Judge had 
certified as correct. The statute stated 
that upon such certification by the judge and 
presentation of the certificate to the 
Auditor a warrant should be drawn for payment. 
In spite of this statute the Auditor refused, 
relying on Sec. 18, Ch. 35, L. 1896 which 
required approval of Examiners before he 
could draw the warrant. The court held that 
the claim must be presented to Examiners for 
approval as required by statute and used some 
very pointed language pertinent to the instant 
problem: 
'The powers conferred upon the 
Board of Examiners, with regard to claims 
against the state, by the constitutional 
provision quoted above, are general and 
sweeping. The power would include all 
claims against the state, were it not for 
the exception which excludes salaries or 
compensation of officers fixed by law. 
An exception of this character may not 
be enlarged nor extended by implication. 
An exception which specifies the things 
that are excepted from a general provision 
strenghens the force of the general provisions 
of the law. ' (Emphasis added.) " 
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The court in the Bateman case cited another case 
avropos to the powers of the Board of Examiners with respect 
to claims for liquidated claims in which the legislature had 
authorized the bounty to be paid for killing coyotes, as 
follows, at Pages 386-387 of 322 P.2d Reporter: 
''The landmark case on this subject 
is that of Uintah State Bank v. Ajax. 
(77 U. 455, 297 P. 434). Action was 
brought to compel the State auditor to 
issue warrants to pay bounty certificates 
for killing predatory animals (coyotes). 
The plaintiff contended that inasmuch as the 
statute fixed the amount to be paid for each 
animal killed and directed the Auditor to 
issue the warrant upon the certificate of the 
County Clerk, and further that nothing in the 
act required submission of the claims to 
Examiners, the Auditor must issue the warrant 
upon presentation of the certificate. The 
bank argued that the amount having been thus 
'fixed by law,' there was nothing but the 
ministerial duty of paying the claim and hence 
it was unnecessary to present it to Examiners. I 
The contention was rejected by the court, saying: 
'The claims here are not fixed by ' 
law in the sense that the legislature 
has made an appropriation of an amount 
certain to a definite named person.' 
and further, 
'all claims are subject to action 
by the Board of Examiners except only 
claims for "salaries and compensation 
of officers fixed by law."' 
"It refused to agree that Examiners should 
examine only 'unliquidated' claims against the 
state, using the following languaq~: 
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'If we should adopt petitioner's 
view, it would follow that the legis-
lature might designate any officer other 
than the Board of Examiners as authorized 
in behalf of the state to settle, fix, 
or liquidate claims and agree upon the 
amount to be paid thereon, and thereby 
exclude the Board of Examiners from its 
duty ***· We cannot agree to any such 
construction of the constitutional 
language, nor may we by construction 
interpolate the word "unliquidated" 
into the Constitution [which] *** has 
vested in the Board of Examiners the power 
to examine and pass on all claims except 
those exempted, and the Legislature is 
without authority to delegate such power 
to any other board of officer.'" 
The court went on to state: 
'If the view is taken that the 
Legislature intended to make this claim 
payable by the Auditor without presentation 
to the Board of Examiners, then the Legis-
lature attempted to do that which it had no 
authority to-effectuate, and in this question 
the language in the case of State ex rel. 
Davis v. Edwards is not only appropr~ate 
but decisive.'" 
The court then concluded in Bateman that, in the 
absence of any capricious or arbitrary actions, the Board of 
Exa~iners and its ad~inistrative arm, the CoMMission of Finance, 
have authority to examine and approve or disapprove of 
proposed expenditures, to adopt regulations pertaining 
generally to salary schedules and personnel in accordance 
with the statutes conferring such power upon them, and that 
the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Board of 
Education are subject thereto in a similar manner to other 
departments of state govern~ento 
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It has long been the established law in this state 
that Article VII, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution is 
an inhibition upon the maintenance of an action directly 
against the state. Thus in holding that the district court 
did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action for alleged 
damages to land and crops resulting from the breaking of an 
irrigation canal, the court in Wilkinson v. State, 42 U. 483, 
134 P. 626, reasoned as follows as to the organic power of 
the Board of Examiners: 
"***In a very recent case the 
Supreme Court of Idaho has again considered 
the question and in our judgment has settled 
it under a constitutional provision like 
ours. The court there holds that although 
expressly authorized to entertain actions 
against the state, yet the court cannot do 
so until the claim has been submitted to and 
passed upon by the Board of Examiners. 
Thomas et al. v. State, 16 Idaho 81, 
100 Pac. 761. The reasoning of both the 
Nevada and Idaho Supreme Courts seems 
reasonable and logical. It is pointed out 
by those courts that the Board of Examiners 
is a creature of the Constitution, and 
that the courts are no more than that. It is 
also suggested that neither can exercise 
powers t~at are withheld by the instru~ent. 
The people of this state, who are responsible I 
for the Constitution and its terr'1s, had the rig:' 
to confer or withhold power as to them seemed 
proper. If, therefore, they erected a tribunal 
and conferred powers upon it to hear and 1 
determi·,·:c the justness of all claims not 
specifically otherwise provided for, the will 
of the people must be obeyed by the courts as 
well as bv all others. As we have seen, even 
the Legislature is prevented from passing upon 
any claim until th~ same has hcen passed on hy 
the State Board of Exaniners. The conditions 
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upon which a claimant may have his claim 
considered and passed on by the Legislature 
of this state are provided for in Camp. Laws 
1907, § 945. In the same compilation, 
Sections 929 to 949 x 1, inclusive, the duties 
of the Board of Examiners and the procedure to 
be followed in presenting and disposing of 
claims are fully set forth. A constitutional 
tribunal is therefore provided for in this 
state in which any claimant may be heard and 
from whose decision he may appeal to the 
only power which can provide funds for the 
payment of his claim if found just and if it 
be allowed. This is all any claimant can 
reasonably ask." 
In addition to the Constitution and cases above 
cited, the legislature has clearly recognized the power of 
the Board of Examiners to examine and act upon all claims 
against the state for which funds have not been provided for 
payment. Thus Section 63-6-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, provides as follovTS: 
"The governor, the secretary of state 
and the attorney general shall constitute 
a Board of Examiners, with power to examine 
all claims against the state for which funds 
have not been provided for the payment thereof, 
except salaries or compensation of officers 
fixed by la1v. No claim against the state for 
which funds have not been provided, except 
salaries and comnensation of officers fixed 
by law, shall be.passed upon by the legislature 
without having been considered and acted upon 
by the Board of Examiners.***." (Underlined 
portions added by amendment in 1963.) 
Andin cases such as the one here involved, Section 63-6-10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
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"If no appropriation has been made 
for the payment of any claim presented to 
the board, the settlement of which is 
provided for by law, or if an appropriation 
made has been exhausted, the board must 
audit the claim, and, if it is approved, 
must transmit it to the legislature ''lith a 
statement of the reasons for the approval." 
The following Section 63-6-11 mandates the filing of such 
claims with the Board of Examiners: 
"Any person having a claim against the 
state for which funds have not been provided 
for the payment thereof, or the settlement of 
which is not otherwise provided for by law, 
must present the same to the board of examiners, 
accompanied by a statement showing the facts 
constituting the claim." 
The broad power and discretion of the Board of Examiners in 
dealing with claims against the state is found in Section 
63-6-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended: 
"The board must at the time designated 
proceed to examine and adjust all such claims 
referred to in section [63-6-11] of this act, 
and may hear evidence in support of or against 
them, and shall report to the legislature 
such facts and recommendations concerning 
them as it may think proper. In making its 
recommendations the board may state and use 
any official or personal knowledge which 
any member of the board nay have touching such 
clains. The board shall not pass upon or send 
to the legislature any claim for which the 
state would not otherwise be liable were it not 
for its sovereign imnunity. But all claims 
wherein the state would be liable, were it 
not for its sovereign iMmunity, whether 
recommended bv the board for approval or 
disapproval, ~hall be reported by the hoard to 
the legislature with appropriate findings and 
reconrnendations as above providecl." 
Thus, the Board of Examiners is directed not to transmit claims 
to the legislature where no liability exists on the part of t~ 
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state disregarding sovereign immunity but it must report all 
other claims to the legislature with its findings and 
recommendation as to approval or disapproval. 
The respondent in this case has circumvented 
both the organic law and legislature pronouncements by the 
submission of his claim for attorneys' fees to the district 
court rather than the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah. 
Such claim is an unliquidated claim for which there has been 
no legislative appropriation for payment. In such cases the law 
of the State of Utah as determined by its Constitution, its 
legislature and its highest court has clearly established 
that the district court is without jurisdiction to hear the 
matter and the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah has 
the exclusive right to examine and determine the validity of 
such claim and, if appropriate, to report its findings and 
recommendations thereon to the state legislature for final 
resolution of the matter. 
The respondent will undoubtedly assert, as he did in 
the court belo·", that the Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of 
campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Commission, 95 U. 242, 70 
P.2d 857 (1937), has determined that claimants with unliquidated 
claims against the State of Utah may proceed to have those 
claims liquidated in court notwithstanding the constitutional 
powers of the Board of Examiners and the Legislature to 
examine such claims and appropriate money to satisfy the same. 
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The plaintiff acknowledges that any judgment so obtained 
in this court would necessarily have to be submitted to 
the Board of Examiners and thence to the Legislature which 
would grant or deny the same. Under that reasoning the 
plaintiff is asking the court system to engage in a time-
consuming and useless effort. The judiciary should not 
be imposed upon to perform an idle function any more than 
individuals should not be required to perform useless acts. 
See Leger Construction, Inc. v. Roberts, Inc., 550 P.2d 
212 (Utah, 1976) and Ericksen v. Poulsen, 15 U.2d 190, 
389 P.2d 739. Thus courts will ordinarily decline to 
decide purely abstract questions or issues. 20 Am.Jur.2d, 
Courts, § 81. It has also been held that a court may not 
exercise jurisdiction if it is without power to enforce its 
adjudication. In Bankers Trust Co. v. Greims, 110 Conn. 36, 
147 A. 290, 66 A.L.R. 726, an action in which a Connecticut 
statute providing that a surviving spouse be entitled to the 
use for life of one-third in value of all the property owned 
by decedent was sought to be made applicable to real property 
in other states, the court held as follows at pp. 730-731 
of the A.L.R. Reporter: 
"The answer to this sitaution, 
counsel urge, is that the fact thQt the 
court could not enforce its decree would 
constitute no adequate reason for not 
carrying out the mandate of the stotute, 
and enforcing it as far as it was ahle to. 
-26-
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Such a deCree would be a mere gesture 
of power. We ought not to conclude that 
the legislature intended so futile a 
result unless the compulsion of that 
construction is inescapable. It is a 
fundamental Principle that courts will not 
adjudicate when they cannot enforce." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Also holding that a court will not adjudicate where 
it cannot enforce the adjudication are In re De Ford, 226 
N.C. 189, 37 s.E.2d 516, and State v. Hyde, 88 Ore. 1, 169 
P. 757. 
In view of the foregoing and the extensive 
consideration given by our Supreme Court to the powers of 
the Board of Examiners and the Legislature to examine and 
consider unliquidated claims against the State of Utah, as 
hereinabove pointed out, it is clear that the decision of 
our Supreme Court in the Campbell case has not become settled 
law which, in effect, permits a sterile court proceeding as 
a prelude to the exercise of constitutional and statutory 
powers by the Board of Examiners and the State Legislature. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 
7 U. 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, long after the Campbell case, 
recognized the broad power of the Board of Examiners to 
investigate claims and act as a fact finder and advisor to the 
legislature with respect to unliquidated claims. It also 
recognized that the function of the Board of Examiners was not 
merely to audit, even in the case of liquidated claims. Thus, 
this court has most recently reaffirmed the constitutional 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
status of the Board of Examiners in much the same manner 
as did the court in Wilkinson v. State, 42 u. 483, 143 P. 
626, which the plaintiff asserts has been replaced as 
controlling law by the Campbell decision. It is clear 
that the plaintiff has not carefully analyzed the holding 
in the Bateman case nor the prior cases cited therein that 
the legislature has no power to circumvent the right 
of the Board of Examiners to exercise its constitutional 
power to act upon all claims (in the broadest sense) by 
permitting others to settle, fix or liquidate such claims. 
Such holding would have equal application to the district 
courts and reaffirms the principal established in the 
Wilkinson decision that avoids the futility of time-consuming 
and meaningless litigation with respect to such claims. 
The decision in Bateman was again reaffirmed in the 
case of Toronto v. Clyde, 15 U.2d 403, 393 P.2d 795 (1964), 
in which the court declared invalid legislation permitting the 
department of finance to "examine and pass upon all proposed 
expenditures" of state agencies and precluding meaningful 
fiscal control by the Board of Examiners. In that case the 
court stated as follows at page 796 and 798 of the P. 2cl Reporter: 
"The extent of the power conferred 
upon Examiners by the language, '*** with 
power to examine all claims against the 
state***,' has been before this court on 
a number of occasions since statehood. 
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In the case of Bateman v. Board of 
Examiners, we gave extensive consideration 
of this problem and reviewed the Utah 
decisions dealing with.it. Upon the basis 
of the constitutional language, its back-
ground and history, including the decisional 
law of the state, we concluded that the 
framers intended to vest in the constitutional 
officers--the governor, the secreta~y of 
state and the attorney general, who are 
elected by and are thus directly responsible 
to the people--more than a mere auditing 
function, that is, power to examine into 
the advisability and necessity of any 
disbursement or proposed obligation 
of the statei***" 
It * * * 
"As we have heretofore stated, from the 
endowment of Examiners with the 'power to 
examine all claims' it is only reasonable to 
assume that it was intended that they should . 
perform that duty. However, as aptly observed 
by Judge Ellett, who tried the case below, 
'This does not preclude Examiners from 
establishing reasonable rules and procedures 
concerning its method of examining claims.' This 
could include the Department of Finance or other 
agencies to determine facts and certify claims 
so long as under the procedure adopted the 
ultimate authority and the duty of pass1ng upon 
claims remains with the Board of Examiners." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is abundantly clear from the foregoing that the 
Board of Examiners, not the courts, has the right to determine 
the methods and procedures by which it exercises its constitu-
tional powers and that it has the ultimate authority and duty to 
pass upon all claims such as the one here presented to the 
Third District Court. Any court proceeding to ascertain facts 
and conclusions of law with respect to such claims would be 
outside the scope of legislative authorization as well as 
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being superfluous, meaningless and incapable of enforcement. 
Such an unconstitutional act of futility on the part of 
the lower court should have been wisely and judiciously 
avoided by dismissing the complaint as prayed for by the 
appellant, and the lower court clearly erred in failing to 
do so. 
The respondent and lower court apparently rely 
upon the Governmental Immunity Act (Chapter 30 of Title 63, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended) as the basis for seeking 
recovery in the courts rather than pursuing the route 
prescribed by the Utah Constitution and statutes as above 
set forth. The only basis for such contention is Section 
63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 
245 of the Laws of Utah, 1977, which provides as follows: 
"This act shall apply to claims 
arising prior to the effective date 
of this act so long as those claims 
are filed in the manner provided in the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
within two years after the cause of 
action arises." 
The purpose of the foregoing portion of the statute, as part 
of the act pRrmitting recovery of attorneys' fees for dismissal 
or acquittal of grand jury indictments against public officers 
or employees, was solely to grant retroactive effect to the 
legislation so as to have application to the respondent's 
claim which arose in 1975. In so doing the legislature 
merely provided the manner by which such prior claims were 
to be filed. It did not extend application of th0 Governmental 
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Immunity Act in any manner whatsoever to claims arising 
subsequent to the effective date of the Act and only 
provided that the manner of filing claims arising within. 
the two years preceding such effective date should be as 
prescribed in the Governmental Immunity Act. The 
legislature did not extend the applicability of the 
Governmental Immunity Act to such claims other than in 
the very narrow area above noted and to imply that an 
action could be commenced thereunder against the State 
of Utah would be contrary to the constitutional and 
decisional law as hereinabove discussed and the express 
provision of Section 63-6-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, which provides the time within which the Board 
of Examiners must act upon claims presented to it. That 
section provides as follows: 
"At least sixty days preceding 
the meeting of each legislature the 
board must hold a session for the 
purpose of examining the claims 
referred to in the last preceding 
section, and may adjourn from time 
to time until the work is completed. 
The board must cause notice of 
such meeting or meetings to be published 
in some newspaper at the seat of govern-
·'ment and such other newspaper as may be 
determined by the board for such time 
as the board may prescribe." 
The manner of filing claims against the State of 
Utah under the Governmental Immunity Act is set forth 
under Section 63-30-12 thereof which provides: 
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"A claim against the state or 
any agency thereof as defined herein 
shall be forever barred unless 
notice thereof is filed with the 
attorney general of the state of 
Utah and the agency concerned within 
one year after the cause of action 
arises." 
In view of the constitutional powers of the Board of 
Examiners as hereinabove set forth it follows that 
compliance with the foregoing statute would not preclude 
the Board of Examiners from the exercise of its powers, 
and any additional application of the Governmental Immunity 
Act contrary to the exercise of that power must fail. 
Thus in construing the applicability of Section 63-30a-3 
to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the 
legislature intended its application to be in harmony with 
constitutional requirements. Thus the filing requirement 
of Section 63-30a-3 merely requires that a notice of 
retroactive claims thereunder be given by filing the same 
with the Attorney General and the state agency concerned. 
It does not purport to supplant the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners by an action to be 
commenced in district court and, indeed, any such 
construction would itself be unconstitutional. It is 
well established law in this jurisdiction that where 
there are two alternatives as to the interpretation of 
a statute, one of which would make it constitutionally 
doubtful and the other would render it constitutional, 
i 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the latter will prevail. See Wagner v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 29 U.2d 42, 504 P.2d 1007 (1972) and State Water 
Poll,ution Control Board v. Sal.t Lake City corp., 6 
0.2d 247, 311 P.2d 370. It therefore follows that the 
filing and notice requirements of the foregoing statutes 
must be construed in harmony with the jurisdictional power 
of the Baord of Examiners in this case which would preclude 
the district court from exercising jurisdiction other than 
to dismiss the complaint herein. 
The res:oondent will undoubtedly argue that the 
provision of Section 63-30-23 of the Governmental Immunity 
Act contemplates court actions directly against the State 
of Utah after whichthejudgment therein obtained may be 
presented to the Board of Examiners and the legislature 
pursuant to statutory and constitutional provisions. It 
provides as follows: 
"Any claim approved by the state 
as defined herein or any final judgment 
obtained against the state shall be 
presented to the office, agency, 
institution or other instrumentality 
involved for payment if payment by said 
instrumentality is otherwise permitted 
by law. If sv~h payment is not authorized 
by law then said judgment or claim shall 
be presented to the board of examiners and 
the board shall proceed as provided in 
section 63-6-10, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953." 
Any such construction of the foregoing statute or the entire 
Governmental I~unity Act as granting to the district courts 
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the power to reduce unliquidated claims against the state 
to liquidated judgments for satisfaction by the Board of 
Examiners and the legislature must fail for several reasons: 
1. The constitutional and statutory powers of the 
Board of Examiners would thereby be reduced to a mere auditing 
function which the legislature and the Supreme Court have 
soundly denounced. 
2. The constitutional power of the legislature 
to make appropriations of public funds would be usurped 
by the courts. 
3. This action for recovery of attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted in 1977, is not included within the cl~sses of 
actions to which the Governmental Immunity Act has 
application. 
4. The only application that the Governmental 
Immunity Act has to the plaintiff's claim is the notice 
requirement thereof as adopted by Section 63-30a-3, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, enacted in 1977. 
POL-JT II 
THE EVIDE{KE 1:1 THIS CASE FAILS TO SUPPOR'.::' 
THE DECREE A>JD JUDGf!EcJT OF THE LOI~F.R C\lVRT 
AND THE SUBSEQUE:n "AGREEHEc'JT" BET\~EEN RES-
PONDE;JT AND HIS _-".T'::'OWJEYS, IF A:-JY, AS f'OU:JD 
BY THI: LO'~ER COURT, "IOULD BE IUVALTD. 
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The evidence in this case admits of only one 
conclusion with respect to the legal fees "necessarily 
incurred" by the respondent as required under Section 
63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, enacted in 1977: 
that the only enforceable claim that respondent's 
attorneys could ever assert for legal fees arising from 
the defense of the grand jury indictments issued against 
him in 1975 is that set forth in the letter dated Sept-
ember 3, 1976, from Wayne L. Black, on behalf of himself, 
his brother John and his law firm, to the respondent at 
his request, in which the total fee for all such services 
is set at $18,500 as follows in Exhibit 4-P: 
Mr. Gerald E. Hulbert 
4964 1'/aimea V.Jay 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Dear Jerry: 
In a way I hate to write this letter be-
cause it is always unpleasant to bill a client 
who is a close friend and I had frankly de-
cided that I would not bill you until the 
final case was diseased of, and, hopefully, 
diseased of in a f~vorable way. However, it 
doe~ appear that there is a likelihood of 
considerable delay in the disposition of the 
final case, and~ consequently, I thought I 
would write you a letter analyzing the fee 
situation. 
You will recall that on May 22, 1975, I 
wrote you a letter outlining the fee situation. 
At that time only the one indictment had been 
presented and none of us had any way of know~ng 
that the other indictments would be forthcom1ng. 
on the basis of the first indictment the agreement 
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, 
was that you would pay a $5,000 retainer, that 
if the case was tried one or more times an ad-
ditional $5,000 fee would be charged,and that 
in the event the case was appealed an additional 
$2,000 fee would be charged. 
Of course, the case was tried and in ad-
dition we have had two appeals to the Supreme 
Court with one involving the first indictment 
and one involving the later indictments. In 
addition, as you know, we have had another trial 
and arguments on innumerable motions. The 
possibility still exists of the necessity of 
t:tying the last remaining case .• 
John and I have given this matter very 
considerable thought. You have paid up to 
date $8,500. Under the existing contract, on 
the first case, the remainder of the fee for said 
case, which is owing, is $3,500. We will con-
sider the entire fee, including whatever pro 
cedures, whether it be a trial or something less 
than a trial, and also including a possible 
appeal, if you paid an additional $10,000, to 
constitute the total fee. This $10,000 would, 
of course, include the $3,500 owed on the first 
case. (Emphasis added.) 
We will keep you advised of further develop-
ments in the remaining case. 
With warmest personal regards, I am. 
Yours sincerely, 
RAHLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
l·IAYHE L. BLACK 
With respect to the foregoing letter, Wayne L. Black 
testified that, in writing the foregoing letter, it was 
his intent to set an amount for legal services beyond 
which he would not assert any legal claim against rlr. 
Hulbert. That testimony was as follows: 
-36-
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Q. And wasn't it your intent in writing 
the letter that is an exhibit here that I 
think i~ dated September the 3rd, that you 
were go1ng to satisfy him by setting an amount 
beyond which you would not assert any legal 
claim against him? 
A. That's right. (R. 322.) 
In response to said letter, the respondent left 
a note at his attorney's offices dated September 10, 1976, 
(Exhibit 5-P) indicating his concern as to making a prompt 
payment of the bill and expressing his gratefulness for 
all they had done for a very minimal charge, and by sub-
sequent letter dated September 9, 1977, (Exhibit 1-D) 
confirmed the foregoing fee agreement and his prior 
approval thereof. 
would this court, or any court for that matter, 
given the foregoing undisputed facts, ever lend its office 
to the recovery of a fee of $61,820 in an action by Mr. 
Black against !1r. Hulbert personally? The answer is so 
patently obvious as to defy reason otherwise. Yet by the 
legerdemain of an underlying desire of the respondent to 
pay his attorneys more than he had the ability to do 
personally with a legislative program conceived and 
brought to fruition by the respondent the lower court 
has imposed a burden upon the citizens of this state 
which it never would have imposed upon the respondent himself. 
In doing so, the court has clearly evidenced its disdain for 
the protection of the public purse and indicated the ease with 
which public servants may spend the hard-earned taxes of the 
body politic. Furthermore, if permitted to stand, such a 
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I 
' 
raid on the state treasury would induce every person charged I 
under grand jury indictments hereafter to arrange a dual-fee 
arrangement with his attorney--one fee based upon his own 
ability to pay in the event he is convicted and another 
sky-is-the-limit fee in the event he is exonerated. The 
legislature never intended Section 63-30a-2 to be a 
lawyer's sweepstakes enrichment act. That section requires 
absolutely that the legal fees recoverable from the State 
thereunder must have been "necessarily incurred" in the 
successful defense of grand jury indictments. The legal 
fees necessarily incurred in such cases should not vary 
by hundreds of percent depending upon guilt or innocence. 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that 
Mr. Hulbert had been found guilty of the charges against 
him. Is there any conceivable basis upon which it could 
then be asserted that he "necessarily incurred" a fee 
greater than the $18,500 evidenced by Exhibit 4-P? Surely, 
the legislature did not intend such term to have a 
different meaning w~en applied to the State's obligation 
under the statute than it has when applied to the individ-
ual's own circumstances. The statute, in effect, renders 
the obligation of the individual to be that of the State--
no more, no less. In this sense the transfer or substi-
tution of liability should be similar to that of a ~rin­
cipal for the acts of his agent, in \-lhich it is well establio!l 
that the ?rincipal is only liable to the extent tl1at 
that the agent is liable. 
------------------- -1R-
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Under such circumstances, the legal fees "necessarily 
incurred" by the respondent are fixed by the billing 
contained in Exhibit 4-P and the liability of the State 
of Utah should be limited to that amount. 
The error of the lm'ler court is evident in its 
mm findings of fact. It necessarily had to find as a 
matter of fact that an important factor in determining a 
reasonable attorney's fee is the client's ability to pay. 
(Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 112.) The evidence in the case 
is undisputed that the respondent's ability to pay has 
been limited to an amount less than his attorneys billed 
him in Exhibit 4-P. 'i.'hus, at the time of trial in this 
case in October, 1978, he had paid his attorneys the total 
sum of $10,000 for legal fees incurred in the subject 
grand jury indictments (R. 178) notwithstanding his 
assurance on September 10, 1976, (Exhibit 5-P) that he would 
be as prompt in the payment of what he considered to be 
a very minimal bill as he could be. And certainly his most 
qualified trial counsel oust have taken that factor into 
consideration in rendering his bill for legal services set 
forth in Exhibit 4-P, albeit it is seemingly high in light 
of the actual circumstances of the respondent. Mr. Hulbert 
also testified that he told clr. Black, after receiving the 
$18,500 bill, that "I would make it right with him if I 
could find it in my means at any time." (R. 153.) Apparently, 
all the respondent's good intentions to pay his attorneys 
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exceeded his ability to do so as his total payment of 
$10,000 thereon clearly indicates. 
In overcoming this seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle, the lmver court had to admit that the "plaintiff's 
ability to pay in this case is limited and dependant upon 
access to reimbursement by the State." (Finding of Fact 
No. 24, R.ll3.) In light of this and other factors, the 
total claim of the plaintiff below was reduced by 20% to 
$61,820. In doing so, the court clearly did not go far 
enough and subGtituted the State's ability to pay for that 
of the respondent Hulbert. There sim~ly is no evidence in 
the record to sustain the ability of the respondent to pay 
$60 per hour ($75 less 20%) for 621 hours plus $8,000 
($10,000 less 20%) for one jury trial, $6,000 ($7,500 less 
20%) for one non-jurytrial, and $170 ($200 less 20%) for each 
of 66 court appearances other than trial and appeals. And it 
is submitted that such fees would fall within the capability of
1 
extremely few individuals, regardless of the "reasonable-
ness" thereof as determined by the court, based on the 
expert testimony of attorney vlitnesses in the case. Tile 
crucial element of ability to pay together with the other 
elements considered in deterr,1ining a reasonable attorney's 
fee in this specific case were merged in the letter from 
Hayne L. Black to his client on September 3, 1976, and no 
ar:tount of verbal gymnastics or rhetoric in the record can 
make valid the lower court's conjuredcontract thereafter on 
the basis of Finding of FJct Uo. 13 (R. lll) which reJds: 
-ilr1- L 
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• 
13. The plaintiff intended his obligation 
to be one for reasonable fees at a then unde-
termined level, and his counsel intended that 
t~e obligation would be contingent upon pl~in­
t~ff's future ability to pay. (Emphasis added.) 
The uncertainty and "iffiness" of any contract founded on 
such a factual basis is so apparent as to require no further 
elucidation. Add to this the further contingency of the 
passage of subsequent legislation and we have the ultimate 
in contractual uncertainty. Thus Findings of Fact Nos • 
18 and 19 (R. 112) provide: 
18. The plaintiff and his counsel agreed 
that plaintiff would pay reasonable attorneys 
fees if an when plaintiff obtained the means. 
19. The passage of Section 60-30a-2, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, by the Legislature 
was, in fact, the occurrence of the condition 
precedent, or contingency, upon which plaintiff's 
obligation hinged. Plaintiff is now obligated 
by his own promise to pay a reasonable fee for 
services rendered, and he has "incurred" such 
a fee within the meaning of the statute. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The statute here involved permits recovery by the respondent 
for attorney's fees "necessarily incurred" by him in the 
defense of the grand jury indictments here involved. The 
evidence is undisputed that he had "incur~ed" attorney's 
fees of $18,500 and anything received by him in addition 
thereto would constitute an unjust enriclu.1ent. If such 
recovery was intended for the benefit of the attorneys 
thenthe real party in interest is not before the court, as 
was pointed out to the lower court at ~- 164-168. But the 
preceedings before the Utah House of Representatives upon 
final passage of the legislation under review (Exhibit 18-D) 
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clearly indicates that the lawmakers only intended "reim-
bursement" to the aggrieved public officer or employee--
not a windfall to his attorneys. 
With respect to the "contract" envisioned by 
the lower court as superseding the only enforceable agreement 
between the respondent and his attorneys, this court has 
spoken in rather clear terms. Thus in Skeen v. Peterson. 
113 U. 483, 196 P.2d 708, 712, the court held as follows: 
* * * After the attorney-client relation-
ship has been entered into, the parties thereto 
may change the terms of their agreement or 
enter into an entirely new agreement, and if the 
substituted agreement was entered into after 
full and fair disclosure by the attorney, such 
an agreement will be upheld. However, such 
contracts are looked upon with great-suspicion 
by the courts, and there is a presumption that 
such agreements are invalid, esoecially where 
the result thereof is to increase the compen-
sation to be received by the attorney, or is 
otherwise of greater advantage to him. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The court then concluded that money paid by ·ti1e plaintiff-
attorney to outside counsel could not be recovered by the 
t)laintiff as par-t of his compensation. Under the facts of 
the case at bar, it would apoear unquestionable that any 
attempt by the respondent's attorneys to recover fees against 
him in addition to the $18,500 amount as set forth in 
Exhibit 4-P would be doomed to failure under the holding 
of the Skeen case. And the public should be no less 
protected than the attorney's client by alleg~d "agree-
ments" entered into subsequent to the creation of an 
attorney-client relationship whereby the compensation of 
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the attorney is increased 3 1/2 times at the understood 
expense of the public rather than the client. The rationale 
underlying the decision in t!1e foregoing Skeen case was 
more fully explained in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 u. 489, 39 P.2d 
1073: 
Notwithstanding the rule that contracts be-
tween attorney and client are held to be valid, 
if entirely fair and equitable, while the client 
forms an entirely free and unfettered judg-
ment, and within any sort of control, yet an 
agreement between attorney and client, varying 
the terms of the original contract or employ-
ment by allowing the attorney greater compensation 
than therein provided, is sometimes held invalid, 
regardless of whether it is fair or otherwise. 
One of the earliest cases in the United States 
is Lecatt v. Sallee, 3 Port. (Ala.) 115, 29 
Am.Dec. 249. In the syllabus, which accurately 
reflects the opinion, it is said that: "An 
agreement made by a client, with his counsel, 
after the latter has been employed in a parti-
cular business, by which the original contract is 
varied, and greater compensation is secured to 
the counsel, than may have been agreed upon, when 
first retained; is invalid, and cannot be enforced." 
And the court gives the following reasons for 
the rule: 
"The firmest ground for the support of the 
orinciole to which the complainant has resorted, 
for relief, consists of the confidence reposed by 
a client, in his attorney, and the influence 
which an attorney has, ovar his client. * * * 
Integrity of character and purity of motive, have 
never enabled such contracts to stand in full 
force, against the principle of equity, which 
cor.unonly excludes all inquiry into the fairness 
of the transactions, and sets them aside as vio-
lations of the policy of justice. * * * 
"The principle will best preserve the high 
reputation of the orofession, by elevating its 
members above the temptation to exercise their 
influence, to obtain advantageous bargains of 
their clients; and consequently, above the sus-
picion of having done so." 
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There are many cases which do not go as far 
as this case, and the views .thereon are well 
expressed by the Supreme Court of Nevada in 
Moore v. Rochester >'Ieaver I.lining Co., 42 Nev. 
164, 174 P. 1017, 1020, 19 A.L.R. 830, where 
it is said: "No principle has been so rigidly 
adhered to by the courts of this country and 
England than that \vhere an attorney deals with 
his client for the former's benefit, the trans-
action is not only regarded with suspicion and 
closely scrutinized, but i·t is presumptively 
invalid on the ground of constructive fraud, 
and that this presumption can be overcome only 
by the clearest and most satisfactory evidence. 
The rule is founded in public policy, and 
operates independently of any ingredient of 
actual fraud, being intended as a protection 
to the client against the strong influence to 
which the confidential relation nat~rally 
gives rise." 
In this case, the lower court specifically found 
that the basis of the subsequent "agreement" between the 
respondent and his attorneys was contingent upon trans-
ferring the obligation for increased attorneys' fees from 
the client to the taxpaying public. (Findi~gs of Fact 
13, 13 and 19, R. 111-112.) Such an "agreement" is invalid 
under the foregoing authorities and contrary to public 
policy, even i~ sue~ an "agree~ent" can be tortured from 
the evidence. See also Centurian Corporation v. Ryberg, 
McCoy & Halgren, 588 P. 2d 716 (Utah, 1978). 
It is, therefore, the position of the appellant 
that the evidence in this case does not sustain an enforce-
able contract between the respondent and his aLtorneys other 
than that set forth in Exhibit 4-P, and evon if it does, 
such subsequent "agreement" is presumptively invalid under 
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the foregoing Utah cases and should be declared contrary 
to public policy. The reputation of attorneys is subject 
to enough present criticism without granting to them a 
special sweepstakes privilege at public expense. 
POINT III 
SECTION 63-30a-3, UTMI CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS 
ENACTED IN 1977, CONSTITUTES RETROACTIVE LEGIS-
LATION ffifiCH EXTINGUISHES VESTED RIGHTS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AHENDMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SEC-
TION 7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITU'l'ION AND IT ALSO 
RENDERS THE ENTIRE STATUTE PRIVATE OR SPECIAL 
LEGISLATION IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VI, 
SECTION 26 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTIOH. 
Section 63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as enacted by Chapter 245 of the Latvs of Utah, 1977, pro-
vides as follows with respect to the right of the res-
pendent to recover against the State of Utah as provided 
in the preceding section: 
This act shall apply to claims arising 
prior to the effective date of this act so 
long as those claims are filed in the manner 
provided in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
and within two years after the cause of action 
arises. 
It is o~ly by virtue of the foregoing provision 
of the statute that the respondent had any standing at all 
to bring the present action inasmuch as every claim for 
attorneys fees asserted by hiQ arose prior to the enactment 
of the statute which was tailored to cover such claims. 
Although Utah has no specific constitutional prohibition 
ag~inst retroactive legislation as some states do, the law 
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has evolved that such legislation is prohibited by the Four-
teenth Amendment when it divests any vested interest. see 
16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §416. The Supreme Court 
of Utah has recognized such restraint. Thus in State ex 
rel Stain v. Christensen, 84 u. 185, 35 P.2d 775, the court 
was confronted by a statute requiring the State Treasurer 
to give a bond but did not provide the time in which to do 
so. After his election and commencement of the term to 
which he was elected, the legislature passed laws requiring 
the Treasurer to give bond within sixty days after his 
term commenced. The court held as follows as page 787 of 
the P.2d Reporter as to the retroactive legislation involved: 
* * * In doing so no vested right nor obligatiooi' 
of a contract was divested or impaired nor any 
new obligation or duty created or imposed. The I 
enactment merely fixed a time when the bond was 
required to be given, the giving of which, as I I 
view the case, was by law required and in force 
when Stain was elected and before he could legally 
assume the duties of the office. * * * We have 
no constitutional orovision as found in constitu-
tions of some states forbidding not only ex post 
facto laws but also retrospective laws or giving 
retroactive operation or effect to a statute. 
* * * I am not holding that a statute, however 
characterized, may be given retrospective 
operation, when by giving it such effect will 
divest or impair vested rights or obligations 
of a contract or i!npose ne\v obligations etc. 
What I say is that the application of the 
statute in question to the matter in hand does 
not do that. (Emphasis added.) 
In Spanish Fork Hestfield Irrigation Co. v. Disl:dct Court 
of Salt Lake County, 99 U. 527, 104 P. 2d 353, rehearing 
denied 99 u. SSG, 110 P. 2d 344, amendments tu a statute 
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9ertaining to the duties of the State Engineer in water 
controversies was involved. In holding that such amendments 
only changed procedural rights and could be retrospectively 
applied inasmuch as there are no vested rights in procedure, 
the court said, at page 360 of 104 P.2d: 
Counsel for defendants is confusing the 
distinction between a "vested" right in pro-
cedure from a "vested" right of action. 
A vested right in procedure of a court is 
quite different from a vested right of action. 
With reference to a right of action it is stated 
in 6 R.C.L. under title "Constitutional Law", 
p. 316, par. 304, as follows: "A vested right 
of action is property in the same sense in which 
tangible things are property, and is equally 
protected against arbitrary interference, and 
whether it springs from contract or the prin-
ciples of the common law, it is not competent 
for the legislature to take it away." 
And this court has approved and affirmed 
this doctrine in the case of Halling v. Indust-
rial Commission of Utah et al., 71 Utah 112, 263 
P. 78, citing 2nd Cooley's Cons.L., 8th Ed., page 
756, and cases cited in the footnote. 
With respect to the divestment of property or 
imposition of liability by retrospective legislation, the 
la'" is well established. Thus in 16 Am.Jur.2d,Constit.utional 
Law, §426, the rule is thus stated as to taking property from 
one person and vesting it in another: 
Under the restraint which the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes 
upon retrospective legislation, as well as 
under the restraints imposed thereon by state 
constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting 
the enactment of retrospective laws, a state 
cannot be a nere act of the legislature take 
property from one man and vest it in another 
directly; nor can such property, by the retro-
spective operation of laws, be indirectly 
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transferred from one to another. Hence, a statute 
is unconstitutional which in effect, either by 
legislative fiat or by direct or indirect operation 
takes the property of one man and gives it to ' 
another. 
As to vested rights in a defense to a cause of action, it 
is stated as follows in 16 Am.Jur.2d,supra, §425: 
While it has been said that there is no 
vested right in a mere defense to a personal 
demand, the general rule may conveniently be 
summarized by stating that a vested right to 
an existing defense is protected in like 
manner as a right of action, with the exception 
only of those defenses which are based on 
informalities not affecting substantial rights. 
Illustrations abound of defenses w~ich are 
clearly substantial and of which a party cannot 
be deprived. (Citing Annotation, 113 A.L.R. 769.) 
And with respect to the imposition of an obligation where 
none existed previously, it is stated in 16 Am. Jur.2d, 
supra, §433, as follows: 
While in general a statute, operating upon 
facts existing at the time of its passage, which 
attempts to impose upon one person a debt or 
duty to another, where there was no right and 
no obligation in existence before the passage 
of the act, is unconstitutional, where a moral 
obligation exists, the legislature may give it 
legal effect by a retroactive statute. 
As to moral obligations there is authority to 
sustain retroactive imposition upon the state or its 
subdivisions of such obligations which were theretofore 
unenforceable (l6A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, §417) but 
it is submitted that no moral obligation is involved in the 
instant case. Liability for the payment of attorneys fees 
has always been recognized as a right created solely by 
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agreement or express authorization by statute. Walker v. 
Sandwick, 548 P.2d 1273 (Utah, 1976); Hawkins v. Perry, 
123 U.l6, 253 P.2d 898. It has nothing to do with a moral 
obligation and, if it did, \'lhy did the legislature limit 
the obligation under Section 63-30a-2 to elected and appointed 
officers and employees of public entities indicted for acts 
within the scope of their employment. Certainly such a 
"moral" obligation, if it exists at all, would extend to 
others required to defend against grand jury indictments as 
well as public officers and employees. Such limitation 
of the beneficiaries of the act in question negates any 
application of the "moral" obligation argument. 
The statute here involved clearly creates an 
obligation on the part of the defendant which did not exist 
at the time the events giving rise thereto occurred. There 
was no moral obligation on the part of the state to pay 
attorneys fees retroactively for any group of litigants~­
let alone a specially favored group consisting of public 
employees amonq the general class of persons subject to 
grand jury indictments. In this respect, the legislation 
would clearly appear to be private or special legislation in 
violation of Article VI, Section 26, of the Utah Constitution 
whicn provides: 
No private or special law shall be enacted where 
a 0eneral law can be applicable. 
It is undi,;::>uted in this case that the respondent, at the 
urging of friends and members of the legislatur2, conceived 
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the idea of the legislation here involved, secured its pre-
paration with the assistance of his attorneys, arranged its 
introduction into the 1977 Legislature and personally 
lobbied "many, many days" for its passage (R. 156-160.) The 
retroactive provisions of Section 63-30a-3 were clearly 
designed for Mr. Hulbert's own personal benefit. If these 
facts do not establish "private or special" legislation with-
in the framework of our organic law, it is hard to conceive 
of any statute which would do so in the absence of the use 
of private given names therein. 
A law relating to particular persons or things 
as a class is said to be general, while a law relating to 
particular persons or things of a class is deemed special 
and private. Johnson v. City of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 
N.W. 270. Under the facts of the instant case, Section 
63-30a-2 ap?lied prospectively to particular persons as a 
class but the retroactive provisions of Section 63-30a-3 
was clearly designed to extend the benefits thereunder to 
extremely few particular persons of the class who had 
become fixed and identifiable at that tine. Such legis-
lation would appear to fall within the purview of 16 Am.Jur. 
2d, Constitutional Law §531, wherein it is stated: 
* * * Efforts are not infrequently made by in-
terested parties to procure legislation in their 
own behalf against other classes of the corm:mni ty, 
but such legislaticJll is not favorec1 hy Uw courts, 
and will be upheld only '"hen it is strictly wi t.'1in 
the legitimate power of Congress or the state or 
municipal legislatures. 
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The retroactive provision of Section 63-30a-3 clearly 
offends Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution under 
the facts of this case. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILE'lG TO GRANT 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS. 
The appellant incorporates herein the arguments 
set forth above in support of POINT IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court totally misconceived the law 
applicable to the facts of this case in its desire to teach 
the State of Utah a costly lesson and thereby chill the 
functions of grand juries in this state. First of all, 
the lmver court \vas without jurisdiction to hear the case 
inasmuch as the Board of Examiners of the State of Utah 
has exclusive jurisdiction in such matters and the attempt 
by the Legislature to circumvent such jurisdiction was 
invalid. Secondly, the evidence in this case does not 
support an enforceable agreement by the respondent to 
pay his attorneys more than $18,500 but even if it did 
such an agreement would be invalid. And last, the legis-
lation relied upon by the respondent is a retroactive in-
tervention in the vested rights of the respondent and the 
taxpayers of this state and constitutes private or special 
legislation contrary to the organic law of this state. 
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The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the 
case dismissed as prayed for by the appellant. 
DATED this 23rJ day of February, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROB~R~ B. HANSEN ·~ 
Attorney General of the State of Utah ,t-~ 
JACK L. CRELLIN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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